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PROTECTABLE PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE SECRETS, AND
GEOPHYSICAL DATA AFTER City of Northglenn v.
GCynberg
INTRODUCTION
[T]he right to exclude [others], so universally held to be a funda-
mental element of the property right, falls within this category of
interests that the Government cannot take without
compensation. I
This assertion recognized a common thread in American property
and mining law.2 The historical drive to develop natural resources re-
quired secure and definitive property rights. Consequently, mining law
recognized that the holder of mineral rights possesses an exclusive power
of exploration and development known as the "exploration right."
3
Beginning in 1978, oil and gas development in Colorado expanded at
an unprecedented rate.4 During the same period, Colorado's population
exploded. 5 Cities along Colorado's front range urban corridor struggled
to satisfy the needs of more and more people.
This concurrent expansion of mineral development and population
led to conflict among competing land use interests.6 Such conflicts raised
questions about the traditional primacy of mineral owners' power to ex-
ploit their mineral rights. 7 Although mineral owners' exploration and re-
covery rights may conflict with land use considerations, this Comment
concentrates on the protection Colorado law affords mineral rights from
improper governmental interference.
As government environmental and land use regulation expands, pri-
vate land use regulation also increases.8 Such government control invites
1. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
2. E.g., United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso 513 F.2d 1383, 1394 (Ct. Cl. 1975);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 1957); Angelloz v. Humble Oil
& Ref. Co., 199 So. 656, 658 (La. 1940).
3. See generally RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 4.1 (2d ed. 1983).
This Comment treats mining law and oil and gas law as synonymous. Differences be-
tween the two fields of law are indicated where relevant.
4. For the twenty-year period from 1960 to 1980, 12,479 oil and gas wells were "com-
pleted" (ready for production) in Colorado. Since 1980, the number of "completed" wells
has totaled 16,841, an increase of 35% over the 1960-1980 period. The author derived these
figures by searching Dwight's Well Data Database, Dwight's Energydata Inc., on November 2,
1993, for the number of Colorado wells by completion date.
5. From 1980 to 1990, Colorado's population increased by 14%. 29 COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES 661 (1992).
6. For a discussion of the broad conflicts between competing land uses, see Robin
Chotzinoff, Surface Tensions, WEsTwoRD (Denver), May 26, 1993, at 22 (discussing current
conflicts between farmers and oil producers).
7. Id. The primary contention described in the Chotzinoff article involved the mineral
owner's recovery right as it conflicts with private landowners.
8. Examples of statutory requirements obligating governmental intrusion into private
affairs include: COLO. Rv. STAT. § 34-1-304 (1984) (requiring populous counties to devise a
mineral recovery plan); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90.5-106 (1990) (granting state engineer
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"takings" claims under state or federal constitutions. 9 As a subset of gen-
eral takings law, the analysis for land use regulations gradually develops
and defines the limits of governmental intrusion.
10
This Comment focuses on the extent to which Colorado mineral law
protects confidential geophysical information from governmental intru-
sion and divulsion. The Colorado Supreme Court addressed the property
right status of geophysical information in City of Northglenn v. Giynberg,l
where the common law primacy of the mineral owner's property rights
were placed in a Takings Clause context. Part I of this Comment illus-
trates the background of mining law and contemporary takings analysis.
Part II sets forth the factual background of Glynberg II and explains the
disposition of the case, including issues the Colorado Supreme Court left
unanswered. Part III analyzes the potential impact of Grynberg 1I on Colo-
rado mining law. Finally, Part IV concludes that Colorado courts should
recognize confidential geophysical information as proprietary information
protected by the Takings Clause of the Colorado Constitution.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Traditional Status of the Mineral Estate
Until severance of surface and mineral estates, ownership of the sur-
face includes ownership of the underlying minerals. 12 When the surface
owner severs the mineral estate, the mineral interest becomes that quan-
tum of real property and appurtenant rights necessary for the economical
extraction of the minerals. 13 After severance, different parties may own
the surface and mineral estates, leading to frequent conflicts over the use
and development of the land.
14
The mineral estate rights include, inter alia, the exclusive right to ex-
plore the geophysical makeup of the subject property-the "exploration
right."15 Information about a parcel's geophysical makeup, such as
power to devise permit requirements for geothermal wells that might affect mineral
reserves). See also COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-91-101 (1990) (policy granting broad authority in
determining permit requirements for underground wells when health or environmental con-
cerns exist). See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IowA L. REv. 631, 666 (1986) (dis-
cussing expansion of police power authority).
9. The respective clauses read: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V; "Private property shall not be taken or dam-
aged, for public or private use, without just compensation." COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15.
10. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (shoreline
protection under the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (statute limiting coal recovery); Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (zoning ordinances in the interest of "open-space" areas).
See also Lazarus, supra note 8, at 666.
11. 846 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1993) [hereinafter Grynberg Ill.
12. Radke v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 334 P.2d 1077, 1088 (Colo. 1959).
13. "[O]wner of a mineral estate has such rights of ingress, egress, exploration, and sur-
face usage as are reasonably necessary to the successful exploitation of his interest." Rocky
Mountain Fuel Co. v. Heflin, 366 P.2d 577, 580 (Colo. 1961).
14. See generally Chotzinoff, supra note 6.
15. See generally Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586, 590-92 (5th Cir. 1957);
HEMINGWAY, supra, note 3, § 4.1; 1 EUGENE KurNrz, LAw OF OIL AND GAs § 12.7 (1987) (noting
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whether the tract contains oil, gas, or coal, and in what quantities, may be
as valuable as the resources themselves. The mineral estate owner obvi-
ously has a strong interest in limiting exploratory access.
The doctrine of geophysical trespass provides redress for private party
violations of the exclusive exploration right.16 Geophysical trespass re-
quires a wrongful appropriation of the exploration right to the detriment
of the mineral-estate owner. 17 There is some confusion over the appropri-
ate remedies 18 , but a number of jurisdictions accept the general doctrine
of geophysical trespass.19
In contrast, governmental entities are not subject to liability for geo-
physical trespass.20 The weight of authority holds that transitory govern-
mental intrusion upon private property for the purposes of surveying and
testing is within the eminent domain power.2 ' When done in good faith,
governmental intrusions to conduct studies preliminary to condemnation
are described as a necessary incident of the right to condemn.
22
Without the protection of geophysical trespass, what recourse does
the mineral owner have when the government imposes on the mineral
that, as between an oil and gas lessor and lessee, the exploration right is not necessarily
exclusive). As seen in Gsynberg v. City of Northglenn, 739 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1987) [hereinafter
Giynberg I], the exclusive right to the geophysical information about one's estate should be
thought of as a necessary element of the right of exploration. For purposes of this Comment,
"exploration" implies the concomitant right to protect confidential information discovered.
Giynberg I, 739 P.2d at 235.
16. See Phillips, 241 F.2d at 592; Giynberg I, 739 P.2d at 231; Angelloz v. Humble Oil &
Ref. Co., 199 So. 656 (La. 1940). See also HEMINGWAY, supra note 3, §§ 4.1, 4.2. Cf RobertJ.
Rice, Wrongful Geophysical Exploration, 44 MONT. L. REv. 53, 59 (1983).
17. See Rice, supra note 16, at 53.
18. See Mark D. Christiansen, Note, Oil and Gas: Improper Geophysical Exploration -Filling in
the Remedial Gap, 32 OKLA. L. Rxv. 903, 904 (1979).
19. E.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957); Picou v. Fohs
Oil Co., 64 So.2d 434 (La. 1953); Franklin v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., 51 So.2d 600 (La. 1951).
See generally Christiansen, supra note 18 (discussing historical evolution of geophysical tres-
pass doctrine and appropriate remedies); Rice, supra note 16 (discussing wrongful geophysi-
cal exploration theories of recovery and damages).
20. The impetus for defining geophysical trespass as a tort is in protecting the mineral
estate owner's competitive position vis-a-vis others in the same business. A geophysical tres-
pass action will commonly require as an element that the information was appropriated for a
wrongful purpose. As governmental entities are not in the mining business, they presumably
cannot have that wrongful intent. See generally HEMINGWAY, supra note 16, § 4.2 at 169.
21. Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 152 U.S. 160 (1894) (state statute
allowing access to inspect mines); McClain v. People, 11 P. 85 (Colo. 1886) (statute authoriz-
ing pre-condemnation possession of property); Duke Power Co. v. Herndon, 217 S.E.2d 82
(N.C. Ct. App. 1975) (authority for preliminary survey for rights-of-way); 2 NICHOLS' THE LAW
ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.02 (Julius L. Sackman & PatrickJ. Rohan eds., 3d ed. 1993). But cf
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-201 (1986) (intrusion prior to exercise of eminent ilomain power is
allowed when deemed necessary);Jacobsen v. Superior Court, 219 P. 986, 990-91 (Cal. 1923)
(survey right contemplates the pendency of eminent domain proceedings); Iowa State High-
way Comm'n v. Hipp, 147 N.W.2d 195 (Iowa 1966) (finding no legislative grant of power to
survey potential site of highway condemnation).
In Colorado the power to make surveys preliminary to condemnation is codified as to
certain public works corporations. COLO. Rrv. STAT. § 38-2-102 (1982).
22. Lewis v. Texas Power & Light Co., 276 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (quot-
ing 29 CJ.S. Eminent Domain § 226(a) (1951)). See also Onorato Bros. v. Massachusetts Turn-
pike Auth., 142 N.E.2d 389 (Mass. 1957) (denying recovery for remote and consequential
injury resulting from survey stakes placed in good faith). See also 2 NIcHoLS, supra note 21,
§ 6.02.
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owner's exclusive exploration right? Stated conversely, when governmen-
tal intrusion exceeds a harmless trespass, should the government incur
liability under a Takings Clause analysis? In Grynberg II the Colorado
Supreme Court determined how much protection the Takings Clause of
the Colorado Constitution affords a mineral owner burdened with govern-
mental exploratory intrusion into his mineral estate.
B. Development of Modern Takings Law
The United States Supreme Court has affirmed the use of the Takings
Clause against governmental authorities in a variety of contexts. 23
Though criticized as ad hoc and unpredictable, 24 the Court's analysis has
gradually increased the list of property rights protected by the Takings
Clause, while simultaneously expanding the dominion of the govern-
ment's "police power."
25
Facing an expanded list of protected property rights and ever-increas-
ing governmental regulation of private property, the Court's takings ap-
proach seeks to accommodate the regulatory function of government with
recognized property rights. Two frequently cited quotations from Justice
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon2 6 reflect the boundaries within
which the modern takings analysis operates. On one hand, the Court
stated that "[g] overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values inci-
dent to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law." 2 7 The Court also stated, however, that "if reg-
ulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking."2 8
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council2 9 established a framework for
modern regulatory takings analysis. 30 Justice Scalia's opinion described
23. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (city must pay
for intrusion in the form of cable reception boxes in private buildings); United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (government liable for excessively noisy flights over landowner's
property). But see PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (no liability for
requiring political demonstrators to have access to shopping center); Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (no liability for limiting building heights as part of
a historic preservation scheme).
24. See generally Leslie Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics, 34 BuFr. L. Rv.
735, 782 (1985) (describing the post-1978 takings approach as beginning a bizarre and ad
hoc "takings renaissance"); Richard G. Wilkins, The Takings Clause: A Modern Plot for an Old
Constitutional Tale, 64 NoTRE DAME L. Rav. 1, 44 (1989) (describing the modern takings ap-
proach as a "crazy-quilt takings jurisprudence" in need of more predictability).
25. See generally Lazarus, supra note 8, at 676 (discussing how the public trust doctrine
has altered the takings analysis by increasing police power in an environmental context).
26. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
27. Id. at 413.
28. Id. at 415.
29. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
30. See generally Richard C. Ausness, Wild Dunes and Serbonian Bogs: The Impact of the Lucas
Decision on Shoreline Protection Programs, 70 DEN. U. L. Rav. 437 (1993) (stating that Lucas
requires states to provide additional protective provisions for wetland owners); Thomas P.
Glass, Property Law: Takings and the Nuisance Exception in the Aftermath of Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 18 U. DAYrroN L. REv. 509 (1993) (discussing the nuisance exception and
balancing-of-factors tests as tools to determine if a regulation taking has gone too far); Jan G.
Laitos, The Public Use Paradox and the Takings Clause, 13J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & Er,-rL. L.
9 (1993) (discussing Lucas' restrictive view of the Takings Clause as advancing a public pur-
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two discrete regulatory takings categories.3 1 The first category arises when
the government has effected an actual invasion of private property in the
asserted public interest.3 2 The second category involves governmental
regulatory actions that deprive owners of all economically viable use of
their property.
3 3
Cases within the second category stress the value and importance of
the right to exclude the public from private property.3 4 Most of these
cases involved a compelled fight of public access to private property with-
out use of the eminent domain power.35 In Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto,3 6 the
Court extended the ability to exclude the public from private property
into the realm of intangible property fights. Monsanto dealt with forced
disclosure of a chemical manufacturer's confidential information in the
context of either a patent registration scheme3 7 or in compliance with
health and environmental guidelines.3 8 In either context, the asserted in-
vasion caused by the forced disclosure affected Monsanto's competitive
position in the chemical industry.
3 9
The Court's analysis established that the Takings Clause protects
trade secrets or proprietary information to the extent the information
qualifies as a trade secret4° under the appropriate state law. 4 1 In holding
pose rather than the taking of private property);James B. Wadley and Pamela Falk, Lucas and
Environmental Land Use Controls in Rural Areas: Whose Land is it Anyway?, 19 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 331 (1993) (discussing the harmful effects of Lucas on farm and ranch landowners);
Robert M. Washburn, Land Use Control, the Individua and Society: Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 52 MD. L. REv. 162 (1993) (discussing the rights of individuals to exercise
control over their land free from unlawful governmental intrusion).
31. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
32. Id. "[N]o matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public
purpose behind it," compensation is required in the context of permanent invasions. Id.
Justice Scalia further described how that principle required compensation in Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
33. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470 (1987) (statute limiting amount of coal a producer could recover); Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (zoning ordinance restricting development). Analysis of the
first category of takings in Lucas is beyond the scope of this Comment.
34. As quoted in the introduction, the right to exclude others is "universally held to be a
fundamental element of the property right ... and [is] within this category of interests that
the government cannot take without compensation." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 179-80 (1979). See also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987)
(citing bundle of rights set forth in Kaiser); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) (citing bundle of rights set forth in Kaiser); Griggs v. Allegheny
County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (entitling owner to compensation where county airport made
home unbearable to live in); United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945)
(noting the existence of a group of rights that an individual has with a physical thing whereby
he can use or dispose of it).
35. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (government may
not force a beachfront landowner to grant a public easement across his beach which does not
serve a public purpose); Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 164 (government may not force a private marina
to open up its artificially created waterway to the general public without invoking eminent
domain power).
36. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
37. Id. at 993.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 999.
40. While in practice the terms "proprietary information" and "trade secret" are not
necessarily synonymous, for purposes of this Comment they are used interchangeably.
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that state law controls the definition of a trade secret, the Court added an
important and widely held caveat: assertedly proprietary information must
be exclusively held by the claimant to qualify for trade secret protection.
42
With the definition of protectable trade secrets in mind, the Court
analyzed the pertinent regulations to determine whether the disclosure
requirements (1) could be justified as part of a regulatory scheme where
the asserted invasion of the property right is tied to, and an essential part
of, a scheme which also confers benefits upon the claimant, 43 and (2) do
so in a manner that does not deprive the property owner of the benefits of
his or her reasonable, investment-backed expectations.4 4 Justice Scalia
emphasized the importance of analyzing the investment-backed expecta-
tions as key to Monsanto's disposition.
45
Monsanto established proprietary information as one of the intangible
property rights protected from improper regulatory takings. 46 Transfer-
ring the Monsanto analysis into the context of a mineral owner's exclusive
right to geophysical information frames the issue in Grynberg I.
II. INSTANT CASE
A. Facts
In 1977 the City of Northglenn investigated sites for a wastewater
treatment reservoir, including certain parcels of land in rural Weld
County.4 7 With the surface estate owner's permission,4 8 Northglenn
tested the property to determine its suitability for a reservoir and drilled a
600-feet-deep test hole to check for recoverable coal deposits as required
41. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04. The Monsanto holding is described as bolstering the
rights of trade secret holders against private sector appropriators. See Carpenter v. United
States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) (citing Monsanto in upholding sanctions against private appro-
priators of trade secrets); MELVIN F. JAGER, 1 TRADE SEcE-rs LAw, § 3.03, at 3-29 (1993).
42. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1001-2 (quoting the Restatement of Torts, § 757, cmt. b
(1939)).
43. Id. at 1007. For examples of government restrictions held not a taking as part of a
scheme which also conferred benefits upon complainant, see Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (state statute protecting surface property from
subsidence damage burdens as well as benefits each person); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255 (1980) (zoning ordinance benefitted the restricted landowner in that it produced
orderly development); Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) (employer as
well as the general public will be benefitted by law allowing any employee to leave work with
pay in order to vote).
44. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005-06. As Grynberg's claim is unrelated to a regulatory
scheme as in Monsanto, only the second part of the Court's analysis (investment-backed ex-
pectations) is germane to the instant case.
45. Id. at 1005. For examples of less-than-reasonable expectations in the takings analy-
sis, see PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
46. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04.
47. Grynberg v. City of Northglenn, 739 P.2d 230, 232 (Colo. 1987). Grynberg's case
went before the Colorado Supreme Court for the first time in 1987, predominately on a
claim of geophysical trespass. Id. at 233. On remand, Grynberg dropped his geophysical
trespass claim and proceeded with an inverse condemnation claim. City of Northglenn v.
Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175, 177 (Colo. 1993).
48. The property in question was divided into separate mineral and surface estates by
prior conveyances. Giynberg , 739 P.2d at 232.
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by state law. 49 Northglenn's soils engineering consultant compiled a test
report,50 the conclusions of which were largely in accord with earlier stud-
ies concluding that the coal reserves underlying the proposed reservoir
site were not commercially recoverable. 5 1 The consultant filed the report
with the state engineer's office, where the conclusions became public
information.
52
Although the surface owner consented, Northglenn never obtained
consent to drill from the mineral owner (the state of Colorado) nor the
mineral lessee -Jack Grynberg. 53 The unauthorized drilling, as well as the
publication of the geophysical information derived from the drilling,
formed the basis of Grynberg's action against Northglenn. 5 4 In Gtynberg
II, on an inverse condemnation claim, Grynberg asserted that the unau-
thorized exploration of his mineral leasehold and release of confidential
geophysical information about its recovery potential diminished his ability
to sell the lease, thereby effecting a taking of his property interest in the
mineral estate. 55
Grynberg asserted four claims arising out of Northglenn's exploration
activities: (1) the city's acquisition of the surface estate effected a taking of
his underlying mineral estate;56 (2) the drilling of a test hole without
Grynberg's consent amounted to a taking;57 (3) the unauthorized publica-
tion of the test results constituted a taking;58 and (4) that his property had




1. Taking by acquisition of the surface estate
The court first addressed Grynberg's claim that Northglenn's acquisi-
tion of the surface estate effected a taking of his mineral estate. Grynberg
based his contention on the holding in Russell Coal Co. v. Board of County
Commissioners.60 In Russell the mineral estate owner prevailed in an in-
verse condemnation proceeding by claiming the condemnation of the sur-
49. Id. The analysis of coal deposits was pursuant to COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 34-1-301 to 34-
1-305 (1984).
50. Grynberg , 739 P.2d at 233.
51. Although inaccuracies existed in the report, it was generally in accord with previous
studies of the area undertaken by the United States Geological Survey and others. Grynberg
II, 846 P.2d at 184.
52. Grynberg 1, 739 P.2d at 233.
53. Id. at 232.
54. Id.
55. GOynbergII, 846 P.2d at 177. Grynberg succeeded at trial on an inverse condemna-
tion claim, receiving an award that was subsequently upheld in Grynberg v. City of North-
glenn, 829 P.2d 473 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991). The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed that
decision and award in Gyynberg I.
56. Id. at 180.
57. Id. at 181-82.
58. Id. at 184.
59. Id. at 180.
60. 270 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1954).
1994]
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face estate overlying his minerals amounted to a taking.6 1 The court
discussed the mineral estate's duty of subjacent support62 and decided
that the duty would prevent Russell from mining coal beneath the newly
condemned land overlying his mineral estate. 63 Prior to that condemna-
tion, Russell owned both the mineral and surface estates and was under no
obligation to provide support.64 When the county condemned the sur-
face, it automatically imposed a servitude on Russell's mineral estate to
provide support.65 As that new servitude precluded the economical recov-
ery of coal, the court agreed with Russell's assertion that the condemna-
tion was a taking of his mineral estate.
66
The Grynberg II court distinguished Russell by pointing out that
Grynberg's mineral estate was severed from the surface years before
Northglenn's intrusion.67 Unlike Russell, Grynberg thus owed to the sur-
face estate a duty of support from the moment he acquired his mineral
lease.68 Accordingly, Northglenn's acquisition of the surface estate did
nothing more than change the identity of the party to which Grynberg
owed support. 69 Without a newly created imposition on Grynberg's estate
and, absent a showing that he was otherwise unable to extract the minerals
from his property, the court denied Grynberg's first claim.
70
2. Taking by drilling a test hole
Citing the importance of the exploration right, Grynberg claimed
that Northglenn's exploratory drilling without his consent amounted to a
taking of his mineral estate. 71 Although the court agreed that the drilling
activity was a physical invasion of Grynberg's property, it found the activity
to be less than a taking.72 For a governmental invasion to reach the level
of a taking, the government must effectively exercise control or dominion
over the property.
73
Noting the transitory nature of Northglenn's invasion, the court cited
Puryear v. Red River Authority of Texas.74 Puryear discussed the government's
ability to survey and test lands to be condemned as a necessary incident of
61. Id. at 773.
62. Id. at 774. "Subjacent support" refers to that support from subsidence given to the
surface from beneath the surface. See RONALD W. TANK, LEGAL ASPECTS OF GEOLOGY 31
(1983).
63. Russell 270 P.2d at 774.
64. See i. at 774.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 775.




71. Id. at 182.
72. "The drilling itself did not interfere with Grynberg's use, possession, enjoyment, or
disposition of his coal lease." Id.
73. Id. (quoting Lipson v. Colorado State Dep't of Highways, 588 P.2d 390, 391-92
(Colo. Ct. App. 1978)).
74. Id. (citing Puryear v. Red River Auth. of Texas, 383 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Ct. App.
1964)).
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the eminent domain power. 75 As a transitory, one-time invasion of
Grynberg's mineral estate within its eminent domain power, Northglenn's
drilling was neither an exercise of dominion nor a taking of Grynberg's
property.
76
3. Taking by publishing geophysical information
Grynberg's third claim was that Northglenn's acquisition of his min-
eral information and subsequent publication of the test results constituted
a taking of his mineral estate. 77 The court first explained that neither the
mere announcement of impending condemnation proceedings nor the
initial publication of information relating to the condemnation amounted
to a taking, even though such announcements may damage the value of
private property.
78
The court then looked to the Monsanto decision for guidance on the
takings approach applicable to intangible property such as proprietary in-
formation. 79 As clearly stated in Monsanto, to classify proprietary informa-
tion as protectable, the asserted trade secret must be neither public
knowledge nor generally known within the pertinent industry.8 0 With that
rule in mind, the court found the information obtained and published by
Northglenn no different in its nature, nor its conclusions, from informa-
tion readily available to parties interested in the economic viability of
Grynberg's coal holdings.8 1 Previous studies concerning the viability of
coal recovery in the area of Grynberg's lease82 were publicly accessible and
in general agreement with Northglenn's report. Northglenn's disclosure
therefore could not be considered the taking of a trade secret.
8 3
Grynberg's failure as to the exclusivity requirement allowed the court
to leave two questions from the Monsanto analysis for another day. First,
does mineral information qualify for trade secret protection under Colo-
rado law? If so, does a mineral estate owner have reasonable investment-
backed expectations that the information will remain confidential?
8 4
75. In a similar factual situation involving core drilling into a mineral owqer's property,
the transitory trespass was found to be part of the eminent domain power. Puryear, 383
S.W.2d at 821. For further discussion of the pre-condemnation right to survey, see supra
notes 21-22 and accompanying text. See also State ex rel. Waste Management Bd. v.
Bruesehoff, 343 N.W.2d 292, 295 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
76. Gsynberg AI, 846 P.2d at 182 (Colo. 1993) (citing Puiyear).
77. Id. at 184.
78. Id. (quoting Lipson v. Colorado State Dep't of Highways, 588 P.2d 390 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1978)).
79. See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
80. Gynberg If, 846 P.2d at 183 (quoting Monsanto, 476 U.S. at 1002).
81. Id. at 184.
82. Id. at 182-83.
83. Id. at 184.
84. "As stated above, we do not decide here whether or not the information as repre-
sented by the undiscovered data from an unexplored mineral lease is a 'trade secret' or other
property which is protected by the federal or state constitutions." Id. at 184 n.18.
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4. Inapplicability of the constitutional damages claim
In addition to his takings claims, Grynberg asserted that Northglenn's
actions unconstitutionally "damaged" his property.8 5 The court pointed
out that a damage claim required either a partial taking of one's land8 6 or
the taking of abutting land.8 7 Since the court found no merit to
Grynberg's first three takings claims, there was no partial taking, and thus
no unconstitutional damage to the remainder of his property.8 8 Grynberg
also failed to prove that access to, or enjoyment of, his property was lim-
ited by Northglenn's actions affecting the abutting estate.8 9 Because
Grynberg only demonstrated a diminution in property value, the court
ruled that Colorado's law of constitutional damaging did not apply to
Grynberg's claims.90
III. ANALYSIS
As urban sprawl encroaches upon rural, mineral-producing areas,
conflicts involving the government's exploratory intrusion into mineral
rights will arise. A balance must be struck between the traditional primacy
of the mineral estate's exploration right91 and the government's need to
carry out their duties without excessive risk of takings liability.92 To a
point, Grynberg II balanced the exclusive exploration right with the govern-
ment's regulatory needs, answering important questions for each side and
85. The Colorado Constitution includes a damages provision in addition to its Takings
Clause. While pure takings claims under the state constitution give property owners at least
the same protection as under the federal Constitution, Colorado's damages provision affords
aggrieved property owners an additional element of protection that the federal Constitution
does not provide. Mosher v. City of Boulder, 225 F. Supp. 32, 35 (D. Colo. 1964).
Interpretation of the Colorado damages provision as supplemental to the general tak-
ings clause follows two separate lines. One line of precedent requires compensation for in-
jury to the remainder of an owner's property when the government takes only a portion of
the parcel. La Plata Electric Ass'n Inc. v. Cummins, 728 P.2d 696 (Colo. 1986). A second
line involves cases where no property is actually taken, but instead, government action limits
or destroys a landowner's access to the property (eg. public improvements abutting private
land). See City of Pueblo v. Strait, 36 P. 789 (Colo. 1894). In either situation, the difficult
requirement of any damage-based inverse condemnation action is a claimant's demonstra-
tion of unique damages or some specific injury not shared by the general public. La Plata
Electric Ass'n Inc. v. Cummins, 728 P.2d 696, 698 (Colo. 1986).
86. See, e.g., La Plata Electric Ass'n v. Cummins, 728 P.2d 696 (Colo. 1986) (holding that
a landowner must be compensated for all damages that are the natural, necessary, and rea-
sonable result of a partial taking); 4A NICHOLs' THE LAw ON EMINENT DOMAN § 14.02(1), at
14 (Julius L. Sackman & PatrickJ. Rohan eds., 3d ed. 1993). The court also noted that this is
the majority rule among the states. City of Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175, 179 n.4
(referring to La Plata, 728 P.2d at 700).
87. Giynberg II, 846 P.2d at 178-80.
88. Id. at 185.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 185.
91. For a discussion of the importance of protecting the exploration right of mineral
owners, see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957); Christiansen,
supra note 18, at 903-04.
92. "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law." Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922). See also Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why
the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. Ra,. 561 (1984) (criticizing modern takings law
as too unpredictable for governments to rely on).
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setting parameters for the relationship between mineral owners and gov-
ernmental entities.
A. The Mineral Estate and Governmental Activities
Grynberg II affirmed the exclusive right of the mineral estate owner to
explore for and retain information traditionally understood and relied
upon.9 3 The court validated the tort of geophysical trespass against non-
governmental parties.9 4 For governmental entities, the court described
how far preliminary eminent domain activities could go without violating
the Takings Clause. For studies and surveys preliminary to condemnation,
there is no taking without an injurious exercise of dominion and control
over private property, or the limitation of access to it.95
The court, however, left unanswered the property right status of
Grynberg's geophysical information. Whether in the context of a regula-
tory scheme as in Monsanto, or an eminent domain setting as in GrynbergII,
future takings claims regarding mineral information will depend on (1)
Colorado's treatment of mineral information as trade secrets, and (2) the
reasonableness of the mineral owner's investment-backed expectations.
B. The Direction of Colorado Law Protecting Geophysical Information
1. Application of Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto
96
Monsanto provides a framework for the asserted taking of intangible
property rights. First, it must be determined if the asserted property right
is protectable under the jurisdiction's law and exclusively held by the
claimant. If so, the next step measures the reasonableness of the claim-
ant's expectations that the government will not divulge proprietary
information.
97
The Grynbeig /H court followed Monsanto's first step in applying the
trade secret/exclusivity test to Grynberg's information. This implies that,
given the opportunity, the court would follow the balance of the test and
determine the reasonableness of a mineral owner's investment-backed ex-
pectations. But in order to do this, Colorado law must first recognize con-
fidential geophysical information as a trade secret.
93. Giynberg II, 846 P.2d at 182.
94. Id. at 184. See also Grynbergl, 739 P.2d at 239 (Colo. 1987). The issue of geophysical
trespass was dealt with in more detail in Gynberg .
95. Grynberg I1, 846 P.2d at 182. Implicit in the court's treatment of this issue is the
reasoning given for the same conclusion in Puryear v. Red River Auth. of Texas, 383 S.W.2d
818 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), where the intrusion of a survey crew was a necessary incident of
the eminent domain power. See also supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
96. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
97. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 986. For more explanation of the Monsanto analysis, see supra
notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
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2. Colorado Trade Secret Law
In 1986 Colorado passed the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.98 Cases in-
terpreting the statute follow the weight of authority in applying a broad
definition of what constitutes a trade secret 99 and the requirement that
proprietary information be exclusively held by the claimant. 10 0 Adoption
of the Act impliedly recognizes that trade secrets are a valuable part of
Colorado's economy and society.' 0 1 On a similar premise, Colorado pro-
tects geophysical information from private appropriation through the tort
of geophysical trespass.10 2 Such protection for geophysical information
impliedly recognizes an analytical framework borrowed from trade secret
law: under the right circumstances intangible information is a property
right deserving of protection.
10 3
As part of federal trade secret law, Monsanto protects intangible prop-
erty rights and bolsters recovery rights against wrongful private appropria-
tors of trade secrets. 10 4 Beginning with an understanding that trade secret
law protects intangible property rights from private appropriation, Mon-
santo then outlines how takings law protects those rights from governmen-
tal appropriation.1 0 5
Colorado should follow the framework established in Monsanto and
extend to geophysical information the trade secret protection currently
provided to tangible and intangible property. Once established as a prop-
erty right deserving of trade secret protection, geophysical data would
98. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-74-101 (1986).
99. "A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of infor-
mation which is used in one's business and which gives the owner of the trade secret an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know of, or use the trade
secret." Mineral Deposits Ltd. v. Zigan, 773 P.2d 606, 608 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (citing the
Restatement of Torts § 757, cmt. b, p. 5 (1939)). See also, Martha E. Ely & J. Stephen Mc-
Guire, Helpfor Colorado Trade Secret Owners, 15 COLO. LAw. 1993 (1986) (discussing Colorado's
adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
100. "The most commonly accepted definition of trade secrets is restricted to confiden-
tial information which is not disclosed in the normal process of exploitation." Porter Indus.
Inc. v. Higgins, 680 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting Aronson v. Quick Point
Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 261 (1979).
101. For a description of the public policy basis for protecting trade secrets, see JAGER,
supra note 41, § 1.01.
102. See Grynberg v. City of Northglenn, 739 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1987).
103. Christiansen, supra note 18, at 914 (suggesting that courts should employ the gen-
eral trade secrets analysis to geophysical information). See also Superior Oil Co. v. Renfroe,
67 F. Supp. 277 (W.D. Okla. 1946) (recognizing geological information as protected under
Oklahoma's trade secret laws). In a slightly different context, it has been suggested that post-
Monsanto, the analysis for the taking of trade secrets should be extended to copyrighted infor-
mation. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property: The Sovereign's Pre-
rogative, 67 TEx. L. REv. 68 6, 690-91 (1986).
Recognition of mineral information in a trade secret context would improve the mineral
owner's chances of recovery from a wrongful appropriator. As modem technology increases
a wrongful appropriator's ability to impinge upon another's mineral estate from afar, trade
secret protection, as premised on the wrongful appropriation of another's competitive edge,
would provide a more feasible cause of action. See generally, Christiansen, supra note 18, at
914.
104. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (citing Monsanto in upholding
sanctions against private appropriators of trade secrets); JAGER, supra note 41, § 3.03.
105. Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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then fit within Monsanto's takings framework for the protection of intangi-
ble property rights.10 6 Though still subject to the eminent domain and
regulatory takings power, a deprivation of geophysical information would
be proscribed unless justified under the common takings analysis.
Grynberg I's reliance on Monsanto suggests that, given the appropriate
factual setting, the Colorado Supreme Court would treat geophysical in-
formation as proprietary information and proceed with the second part of
the Monsanto analysis. Upon recognizing that mineral information quali-
fies as a protectable trade secret, the court could then weigh the reasona-
bleness of investment-backed expectations or the government's interest in
the "taken" property. Such an analysis would comport with modem think-
ing as to the appropriate takings protection for intangible property
rights. 107
CONCLUSION
The decision in Grynberg II puts governmental entities on notice that
their intrusions into private mineral estates may require compensation
under Colorado's Takings Clause. The Colorado Supreme Court recog-
nized that the exercise of dominion over a mineral estate is a taking. How-
ever, the court's analysis did not determine the level of takings protection
that geophysical data deserves as proprietary information.
Mineral owners faced with forced divulsion of confidential geophysi-
cal information could assert Giynberg II's reliance on Monsanto as a founda-
tion for protection. Monsanto validated the use of the takings analysis for
proprietary confidential information. In so doing, the Colorado Supreme
Court signalled a direction for the future of takings protection for intangi-
ble property rights. Using the Monsanto trade secret and confidential in-
formation approach, however, the Grynberg II court did not define the
status of geophysical information under Colorado's trade secret analysis.
This left the status of geophysical information under Colorado's Takings
Clause undecided.
A number of factors suggest that Colorado courts would recognize
confidential geophysical information as proprietary information protected
by the Takings Clause: a broad definition of protectable trade secrets, t0 8
recognition of geophysical trespass as a valid cause of action against pri-
vate parties, 10 9 and the reference in Grynberg II to Monsanto's intangible
106. The Monsanto court referred to a number of intangible property rights protected
under the federal takings analysis. Monsanto, 467 U.S at 1003. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (materialman's lien); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,
295 U.S. 555 (1935) (real estate lien); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) (valid
contracts protected).
107. "Because of the unique nature of the property, governmental action which force[s]
or sanction [s] an unauthorized, destructive disclosure of a trade secret should constitute such
a deprivation and 'taking.'"JAGER, supra note 41, § 3.03; Ruckleshausv. Monsanto, 467 U.S.
986, 1004-05 (1984). See also Kwall, supra note 104, at 690-91 (suggesting trade secret protec-
tion for copyrighted materials used in public schools).
108. Mineral Deposits Ltd. v. Zigan, 773 P.2d 606, 608 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (citing the
Restatement of Torts § 757, cmt. b (1939)).
109. Grynberg v. City of Northglenn, 739 P.2d 230, 231 (Colo. 1987).
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property rights protection. 1 0 Constitutional protection for confidential
geophysical information would validate the importance of mining law's
exploration right and protect the investment-backed expectations of
thousands of Colorado mineral owners. Failure to protect geophysical in-
formation from improper governmental intrusion undermines the spirit
of Monsanto and disrupts property rights within Colorado's important min-
ing industry.
James W. Griffin
110. City of Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175, 183 (Colo. 1993).
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